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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

MICHAEL W. SPAULDING,

:

Case No.

981437-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from his conviction for possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did defendant's possession of marijuana and a marijuana pipe arise out of the
same "single criminal episode" as his constructive possession of methamphetamine so
as to preclude the State from prosecuting defendant for felony possession of
methamphetamine following his guilty pleas to misdemeanor possession of marijuana
and drug paraphernalia?

This issue of statutory construction is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Keppler, No. 981182CA, slip op. at 2 (Utah App. March 25, 1999) (Appendix A).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 403 are reproduced in
Appendix B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 26, 1997, defendant was arrested and issued misdemeanor citations
for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia and for parking in a grassy area.
On September 8, 1997, defendant pleaded guilty to these three offenses (R. 72). On
the same day, a felony information was filed charging defendant with possession of
methamphetamine (R. 1). At a preliminary hearing on December 12, 1997, defendant
moved to dismiss the information based upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, the "single
criminal episode" statute (R. 73:3). This motion was denied, and defendant was found
guilty by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (R. 47). On
June 30, 1998, defendant was sentenced to a term of 1-15 years on the
methamphetamine charge, with execution of sentence stayed pending defendant's
completion of 36 months probation and serving ten days in jail (R. 55-57).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 26, 1997, defendant and Monique Case were traveling from Idaho to
Arizona by motorcycle and stopped at Willard Bay State Park in Box Elder County (R.
2

73:4, 7-8). Officers Ulysses Black and James Crapse approached defendant and Ms.
Case, who were sitting at a picnic table, due to the fact that defendant's motorcycle was
parked illegally on the grass (R. 73:17). The officers saw a bowl of marijuana at the
table, and defendant was holding a marijuana pipe (R. 73:19). At another picnic table
several feet away, the officers found a small tin box which contained methamphetamine
in a pocket of a pair of pants belonging to defendant (R. 73:20-21, 28-29).
Defendant was cited for parking on a grassy area and for possession of
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On September 8, 1997 defendant appeared before
the district court for arraignment on these misdemeanor charges. Immediately upon
defendant's guilty pleas to these charges, the prosecutor requested that sentencing be
delayed due to the fact that he had just that morning received a report regarding the
methamphetamine found in defendant's pants, and that a felony charge arising out of
that report might be filed (R. 72:4-5). The court then immediately offered to allow
defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas to the misdemeanor charges. Defendant declined
to do so at that time, and subsequently never made a request to withdraw his
misdemeanor pleas following the State's decision to pursue the felony charge (R. 72:5,
7-8).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Since defendant's brief was filed, this Court issued its opinion in State v.
Keppler, No. 981182CA (Utah App. March 25, 1999). In Keppler, the Court rejected
3

the same argument made by this defendant, based on facts that are virtually identical to
the facts of this case. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 defines a criminal episode as
including all conduct which is closely related in time and incident to a "single criminal
objective." Under Keppler, the criminal objective of a possessory offense depends
upon the specific nature of the property possessed. Thus, although defendant's
possession of marijuana and a marijuana pipe was contemporaneous with his possession
of methamphetamine, these criminal acts do not share a criminal objective. These
offenses are therefore not part of a "single criminal episode" which must be charged in
a single action under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 & 403. Accordingly, defendant's
prior guilty pleas to misdemeanor charges of possession of marijuana and drug
paraphernalia do not preclude this later prosecution of defendant for possession of
methamphetamine.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA AND
HIS POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE DO NOT
ARISE OUT OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE
Defendant claims in this appeal that the State is barred from prosecuting him for
felony possession of methamphetamine because the State also cited him for
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and allowed him to plead
to those misdemeanor charges prior to filing the felony methamphetamine possession

4

charge. This argument is based upon Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1) (1974), which
provides that
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of
a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a
different offense is barred if (a) the subsequent prosecution is for an
offense that was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2)
in the former prosecution; and (b) The former prosecution . . . resulted in
conviction.
Under § 76-1-402(2) (1974), if multiple charges arise out of a single criminal episode,
a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials unless the court orders otherwise. Thus,
in order for the State to be barred from prosecuting defendant for the felony
methamphetamine charge, the trial court must find that the prior charges of possession
of marijuana and drug paraphernalia were a part of the same "criminal episode."
The term "single criminal episode" is defined for purposes of this rule as "all
conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401.
Accordingly, resolution of this case depends upon a finding as to whether defendant's
possession of methamphetamine is, under the specific facts of this case, "incident" to
the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as defendant's possession of
marijuana and a marijuana pipe.
The issue presented by this case is substantially resolved by the court's ruling in
State v. Keppler, No. 981182CA (March 25, 1999). In that case, the court considered

5

whether Keppler's prior guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia precluded a
later prosecution for possession of methamphetamine when the drug paraphernalia and
the methamphetamine were found in Keppler's possession "at the same time and in the
same location."
The court held that the criminal objective in a possessory offense is determined
by "the specific nature of the property possessed." Id., slip op. at 2. Accordingly, the
defendant's criminal objectives were, for the respective offenses, to possess
methamphetamine and to possess drug paraphernalia. Since these objectives were
different, they were not part of the same criminal episode under section 76-1-401. See
also State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995).
The only distinguishing fact between this case and Keppler is that in this case,
defendant plead guilty to possession of both marijuana and drug paraphernalia prior to
the filing of the methamphetamine charge. Keppler noted that the drug paraphernalia
charge was based upon a separate statutory provision, and used that fact to emphasize
the point that drug paraphernalia possession and methamphetamine possession do not
share a common criminal objective. Keppler, slip op. at 2. However, the fact that
defendant's possession of methamphetamine and marijuana were charged under the
same general code section does not distinguish this case from Keppler for several
reasons.

6

First, although the court in Keppler noted that the possessory offenses at issue
were punishable under different code sections, it did not base its decision on that fact;
rather, the court held more broadly that it is the "specific nature" of the property which
determines whether possession shares the same criminal objective. Id., slip op. at 2.
In every one of the cases from other jurisdictions cited approvingly by the court in
Keppler, the separate charges at issue were for possession of two different types of
controlled substances, as is true in this case. Indeed, in most of these cited cases, the
separate possessory offenses were charged under the same code section. See People v.
ManarreZy 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. App. 1998) (defendant was properly charged
separately under the same code section for simultaneous possession of heroin and
cocaine); Cunningham v. State, 567 A.2d 126 (Md. App. 1989) (same); State v.
Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986) (defendant was properly charged separately
under the same code section for simultaneous possession of cocaine and marijuana).
As was true in these cases cited in Keppler, the distinction between different
types of controlled substances has been fully recognized by the Utah Legislature.
Although possession of controlled substances is generally prohibited by Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8, the code treats drug offenses differently depending upon the specific
type of controlled substance at issue. Thus, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(b)(iii), marijuana possession is a class A misdemeanor, and pursuant to Utah Code

7

Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii), methamphetamine possession is a third degree felony.1 "The
narcotics are separately classified and regulated by the Legislature; they have different
effects and pose different hazards to society." Manarrez, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d at 250.
In addition, there is no reasonably characterized 'common objective' for these
offenses asserted by defendant. Defendant claims that the common purpose of all the
charged offenses was "illicitly to use controlled substances." Brief of Appellant, p.5.
Such a characterization of the purpose of the charged offenses could hardly be stated
more broadly, and is the equivalent of saying that his purpose was "to break the law."
At this level of generality, almost any combination of crimes would fall under the
single criminal episode rule, since it is only the illegality of the acts which gives them
any commonality at all. Instead, as Keppler requires, the criminal objective of
defendant's possessory acts must be characterized in terms of the specific substance
possessed: defendant's objective in one offense was to possess marijuana and in the
other offense was to possess methamphetamine. Thus, in each case, defendant's
purpose was not simply to possess an illegal substance; it was to possess a particular
drug which has particular properties. See Strader, 902 P.2d at 642 (the objectives of
the criminal acts are to be construed narrowly for purposes of determining whether they

1

Defendant's methamphetamine possession charge was raised from a third
degree felony to a second degree felony because the offense took place in a public park.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(c) (1998).
8

constitute a single criminal episode under section 76-1-401). See State v. Cornish, 571
P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (offenses cannot be treated as a single criminal episode
under section 76-1-401 because "although the testimony given may overlap, the
offenses are different and the proof requirements are different."). The distinction
drawn between these crimes by the legislature distinguishes thus this case from
situations which section 76-1-403 was obviously intended to address, where a defendant
could otherwise be forced to defend essentially the same charge in multiple
prosecutions. See State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983).
Ultimately, the unreasonableness of defendant's argument is made clear by the
fact that his argument would seem to dictate joinder of offenses even in cases where
such would likely be improper. Under defendant's view, joinder of offenses would be
required under section 76-1-402 whenever similar offenses are committed by a
defendant, no matter how unrelated they are factually. In many cases, it is the very
similarity of unrelated offenses which forms the basis for a motion to sever, as evidence
used to show guilt on one offense could be improperly used to imply guilt of another
unrelated but similar crime.2 See State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980)
(joinder of similar offenses is improper when there is no showing that there is a

2

As in Stradery "a cynic might suggest that if the three charges would have been
brought together initially, [defendant] would have moved to sever, arguing that the
three offenses were completely distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced if they
were all tried together." 902 P.2d at 641 n. 3.
9

common scheme, and where the evidence admissible to prove each offense would not
be admissible with regard to the others); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1992)
(issue as to whether joinder is prejudicial to a defendant depends upon whether
evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial.)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ _ day of April, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SCOTT KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 981182-CA
F I L E D
(March 2 5 , 1999)

Kalob Ted Keppler,
Defendant and Appellant

1999 UT App 089

First District, Brigham City Department
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
Attorneys:

Kevin McGaha, Brigham City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and James Beadles, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Wilkins, Greenwood, and Billings.
BILLINGS, Judge:
ill Kalob Ted Keppler (defendant) appeals from a conditional
guilty plea for possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
*{2 On April 5, 1997, in a search incident to an arrest,
defendant was found in possession of marijuana, methamphetamine,
and a pipe with marijuana residue. Defendant was cited for
possession of drug paraphernalia and on April 14, 1997, he
pleaded guilty to that offense, a class B misdemeanor, and was
sentenced to probation. That same day, the State filed an
information charging defendant with possession of
methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. These charges all arose from
the evidence discovered during the April 5th search.
1|3
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his guilty
plea to possession of paraphernalia barred the district court
prosecutions because the offenses were all part of the same

criminal episode under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1)(a) (1995).
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and defendant
subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of
methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal. The State had
already dismissed the other charges.
ANALYSIS
1(4
This appeal presents a single question: Whether, under the
"single criminal episode" statute, see id. § 76-1-403(1), a
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine is barred when
defendant had already pleaded guilty to possession of drug
paraphernalia found at the same time and in the same location as
the methamphetamine. We review the trial court's interpretation
of a statute for correctness and accord no deference to its
conclusions of law. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah
1995) .
115
The statutory scheme provides "[i]n this part unless the
context requires a different definition, 'single criminal
episode1 means all conduct which is closely related in time and
is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective." Id. § 76-1-401 (emphasis added). In this
case, although defendant's concurrent possession of the marijuana
pipe and the methamphetamine satisfied the temporal requirement
of the statute, the possession does not satisfy the "same
criminal objective" requirement. See id.
1)6
The specific nature of the property possessed determines the
offense in a possession offense. In this case, we note that the
property implicated in the two charges is not of the same
quality. The Legislature expressly prohibits the possession of
drug paraphernalia and the possession of methamphetamine as
separate statutory offenses. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(2) (Supp. 1998) (possession of a controlled substance) with Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 1998) (possession of drug
paraphernalia). Other courts which have evaluated this statutory
structure have concluded it creates discrete crimes even when the
contraband items are found simultaneously. See, e.g., People v.
Monarrez, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. App. 1998), reVt denied 1998
Cal. Lexis 8599 (Cal. 1998). See also Cunningham v. State. 567
A.2d 126, 129 (Md. Ct. App. 1989); People V, HiltS, 638 N.Y.S.2d
491, 492 (1996); State v. Delfino. 490 N.E. 2d 884, 887-88 (Oh.
1986) .
%1
Further support for the separate nature of defendant's
crimes comes from State v. Porter. 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah
1985) . In that case, the defendant had, within twenty minutes,
burglarized an apartment and a laundry room, both located in the

981182-CA

2

same building. The court concluded that defendant's crimes were
separately punishable because "defendant's actions did not
constitute a single crime," since the elements of burglary and
aggravated burglary are different. Id. at 1178. See also State
v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
giving false identification to a police officer not incident to
same criminal objective as possession of methamphetamine).
Similarly, defendant's crimes in this case are separately
punishable.
CONCLUSION
K8
We conclude that the crimes do not satisfy the .second
statutory requirement for a single criminal episode as the crimes
have separate criminal objectives. We therefore affirm.

rmdith M. Billings, Judge

19

WE CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge

<2h>*uy&'

S '

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

981182-CA
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ADDENDUM B

CRIMINAL CODE

259

(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a
public office or during the period of his public employment; or
(ii) within two years after termination of defendants public office or public employment,
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5, Subsection (3) shall not extend the period of limitation otherwise
applicable by more than three years.
1995
76-1-303.5. Sexual offense a g a i n s t a child.
If the period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302(1) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for rape
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexual
abuse of a child, or aggravated sexual abuse of a child within
four years after the report of the offense to a law enforcement
agency.
1996
76-1-304.

D e f e n d a n t out of state — P l e a h e l d invalid —
New prosecutions.
(1) The period of limitation does not run against any
defendant during any period of time in which the defendant is
out of the state following the commission of an offense.
(2) If the defendant has entered into a plea agreement with
the prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate his
conviction, the period of limitation is suspended from the time
of the entry of the plea pursuant to the plea agreement until
the time at which the conviction is determined to 6e invalid,
and that determination becomes final.
(3) For purposes of this section, "final" means:
(a) all appeals have been exhausted;
(b) no judicial review is pending; and
(c) no application for judicial review is pending.
(4) When the period of limitation is suspended pursuant to
Subsection (2), the suspension includes any charges to which
the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement,
charges which were dismissed as a result of a plea agreement,
as well as any known charges which were not barred at the
time of entry of the plea.
(5) Notwithstanding any other limitation, a prosecution
may be commenced for charges described in Subsection (4)
within one year after a plea entered pursuant to a plea
agreement has been determined to be invalid, and that determination becomes final.
1998
76-1-305.

Lesser i n c l u d e d offense for w h i c h period of

limitations has run.
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which
the period of limitations has not run and the defendant should
be found guilty of a lesser offense for which the period of
limitations has run, the finding of the lesser and included
offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall
not be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
1973
76*1-306. Judge to

determine.

When an issue concerning the statute of limitations is
raised, the judge shall determine by a preponderance of the
evidence whether the prosecution is barred by the limitations
in this part.
1996
PART 4
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS A N D
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
76-1-401.

"Single criminal episode" defined — J o i n d e r
of offenses and d e f e n d a n t s .
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.

76-1-403

Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the
effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses
and defendants in criminal proceedings.
1995
76-1-402.

Separate offenses arising out of single criminal e p i s o d e — Included offenses.
( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single
court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in
the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or
form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an
offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser
included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged
and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment,
or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
1974
76-1-403.

F o r m e r p r o s e c u t i o n barring s u b s e q u e n t
p r o s e c u t i o n for offense out of s a m e e p i s o d e .
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of
the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent
prosecution.

76-1-404

CRIMINAL CODE

(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment;
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury
trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However,
termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the
termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the
termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the
trial in conformity with the law; or
lii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not
attributable to the state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of
law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent
a fair trial.
1974
76-1-404.

Concurrent jurisdiction — P r o s e c u t i o n i n
other jurisdiction barring prosecution i n
state.
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one
or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this
state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those
terms are defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses.
1973
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is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense"
mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence ofjurisdiction and venue are not elements
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.
1973
76-1-502.

N e g a t i n g defense by allegation or proof —
When n o t required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or
other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution
or the defense; or
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative
defense.
1973

TO-\-5fo&. PTfcs\rarp\itm t>1 iBtfc.
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or
other penal statute has the following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presumption exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed
fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a presumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by d e f e n d a n t
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant.
1973
PART 6
DEFINITIONS

76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — Cir- title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and incumstances.
cludes speech.
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred
V^> " k c W means a person whose mmiuiai TesponsftaV
under the SoYiowing circumstances:
ity is in issue in a criminal action.
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defen(3) "Bodily injury* means physical pain, illness, or any
dant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney
impairment of physical condition.
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of
bodily injury; or
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar collateral attack.
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
1978
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe
PART 5
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury; or
B U R D E N OF PROOF
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally
or in any other manner that he is in control of
76-1-501. P r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e — "Element of t h e
such an item.
offense" defined.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of
( D A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
this state.
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him

